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Abstract An important trend in contemporary metaphysics denies that the structure
of natural language is an important datum for investigating fundamental structure.
Ted Sider proceeds on this basis to propose a metaphysical semantics for natural lan-
guage. Within this framework he argues that natural language and a fundamental,
‘jointcarving’, language could be subject to distinct logics. Developing an argument
of Hartry Field’s, I show that Sider’s preferred option of fundamental classicality
combined with non-fundamental non-classicality trivialises within the framework of
Siderian metaphysical semantics. The position can be saved only by revising key
claims about truth and metaphysical semantics. This has serious implications for
methdology in the metaphysics of logic.
Keywords Metaphysics of logic · Paradox · Nonclassical logic · Dialetheism ·
Truth · Sider
A familiar thought in contemporary metaphysics is that ordinary thought and lan-
guage concern themselves with matters other than the fundamental structure of
reality. In order to uncover that structure, if – contra Kant – this is possible at
all, serious philosophical work is required. In the course of the investigation ordi-
nary language will require regimentation, locutions concerning to non-fundamental
structure will be paraphrased away, and vocabulary which does not, in the familiar
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phrase, ‘carve at the joints’ will be eliminated.1 But where does the exercise leave
our ordinary everyday language?
Suppose, for instance, that there are, fundamentally, in the joint-carving sense of
the quantifier, no composite objects. What remains of my assertion, outside the ontol-
ogy room, that there is a cup of coffee on my desk? There are, fundamentally, in
the joint-carving sense of ‘there are’, neither coffee cups nor tables. Are we, then, to
adopt an error theory about my assertion? That suggestion surely deserves an incred-
ulous stare if any philosophical thesis does.2 Excepting sceptical scenarios, my belief
that it is true that there is a cup of coffee on my desk – look, there it is – is far more
justified than any conjunction of philosophical claims to the contrary implication. A
better response is to claim that nonfundamental facts – such as that there is a cup of
coffee on my desk – are to be explained in terms of fundamental facts, and that sen-
tences in a language equipped to talk about nonfundamental facts can be supplied
with a metaphysical semantics. This project is sketched by Theodore Sider.
What is a metaphysical semantics? For Sider it is a certain kind of theory of
meaning, the explanatory aspirations of which are continuous at some points, dis-
continuous at others with those of (what he terms) linguistic semantics. Thus, for
instance,
. . .just like the linguistic semanticist, she wants to help explain why English
speakers will point to the salient horse, rather than the salient car, when they
hear the sounds ‘Point to the horse!’; and like the linguistic semanticist, she
will invoke concepts like truth and reference to do so. But she is not concerned
to integrate her semantics with other linguistic or psychological theories. Thus
she is not trying to integrate her semantics with syntactic theory, for example.
[12, 113]
There is much here with which one could take issue. Can the issue of sentential
meaning, in any useful sense of the word ‘meaning’, really be separated from the
semantic contributions of subsentential expressions and so from the syntactic back-
ground of compositionality? Is there really an adequate answer to the question why a
speaker points to a horse rather than a car which doesn’t, at least tacitly, appeal to the
concept of understanding?3 These questions are work for elsewhere, however; I will
proceed by taking Sider on his own terms and seeing where the path of metaphysical
semantics leads.
1The thought that regimentation is a necessary prerequisite to ontology finds classical expression in Quine,
and has subsequently been defended by van Inwagen [10, 13]. More than any other metaphysician in
recent decades, Armstrong stressed the independence of ontology from the analysis of natural language,
in particular separating the debate about universals from questions about the semantic contribution of
predicates [1, 2]. Sider brings these themes together in his work on metaphysics and fundamentality [12]
Note, however, that Sider’s disregard for natural language as a guide to metaphysics is more absolute than
either Armstrong’s or Quine’s.
2The best-known denier of tables and coffee cups having a place in the furniture of the world, Peter van
Inwagen, agrees here. See [13, 5].
3‘[The metaphysical semanticist] is free to assign semantic values that competent speakers would be inca-
pable of recognising as such, for she is not trying to explain what a competent speaker knows when she
understands her language’ [12, 111]. But if that is not what she is trying to explain, how is what she trying
to explain meaning?
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Sider allows that some parts of natural language might appropriately be supplied
with an expressivist metaphysical semantics.4 Canonically, however, and clearly
appropriately for cases such as my assertion about the coffee cup, a metaphysical
semantics for a (portion of a) natural language L takes the form of a truth theory,
within which theorems of the following form are derivable:5
Sentence S of L is true in L iff φ (T)
Where φ is couched in perfectly joint-carving terms. We call φ the metaphysical
truth-condition of S. T itself is not couched in perfectly joint-carving terms, but is
a sentence of mathematically enriched natural language with the resources to talk
about sentences which are themselves composed of joint-carving expressions. We
can, for the time being, imagine the range of φ as consisting of formulae of a language
all of whose vocabulary items do carve at the joints.6 In due course, we will have
reason to revise this understanding of φ, but Sider himself thinks of it as ranging over
formulae of a joint-carving language, so we will join him in this at this point in the
dialectic. Call one such joint-carving language F. The argument of the present paper
is that the assumption that F is governed by classical logic reduces to triviality in
combination with other suppositions made by Sider about metaphysical semantics;
the result is a simple extension of a liar-style argument proposed by Hartry Field. This
causes trouble for the project of metaphysical semantics in as much as it is committed
to the classicality of a fundamental language capable of stating the metaphysical
truth-conditions for a nonclassical language.
Say that a logic  governs a language G iff for all sets of G-sentences  and all
G-sentences φ,7
  φ iff either some g ∈  is false or φ is true. (L)
We’ll skip over here the possibility of ‘draws’, where more than one logic governs
a given language, and the delicate question of how these ought to be adjudicated.8
Now, in order to get a handle on the Metaphysical Liar, observe that the logic
governing F may be distinct from the logic governing L. For Sider this is not an
abstract possibility. Acknowledging the multiple pulls towards thinking that ordinary
language is governed by a nonclassical logic, he nonetheless makes the case that,
4He envisages this for normative discourse, and issuing in theorems of the form Normative sentence S of
L, as uttered by speaker x, is expressively appropriate for x in L iff φ(x). [12, 113]
5The thought being presumably that a theory of meaning can be given through an account of truth-
conditions. Note, however, that ‘is true’ here is a standard natural language truth predicate, no further
account of which is offered [12, 113] Familiar Dummettian worries might be raised here; these become
more urgent when we see the difficult decisions about a theory of truth for L that are forced on the
metaphysical semanticist as the present paper develops. [4, Ch. 3]
6For Sider, joint-carving is a matter of ideology as well as ontology. So not merely quantifiers and names,
but also predicates and logical connectives can be thought of as joint-carving.
7I’ll assume that each language is equipped with a proof system which is sound for the semantic
consequence relation on the logic governing the language. This should be thought of, in the case of
nonfundamental natural languages, as modelling pre-formal good deductive reasoning using that language.
8Actually draws are a certainty. Take some  which governs G, now choose some  which is a conserva-
tive extension of  with respect to theG-wffs.  governs G. There’s a strong temptation to say that draws
of this sort are not a real issue, since there’s no salient disagreement between the two logics.
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. . .although classical logic is an inadequate model of all the complexities of
natural language, it is adequate for the simpler language of mathematics and
fundamental science. And it is also tempting to privilege the latter languages in
some way. Logic is ultimately classical; it’s just that natural languages hook up
to reality in complex and indirect ways. [12, 231]
If L is governed by a nonclassical logic, whilst F is governed classically, then the
metaphysical truth-conditions for L cannot be logical form preserving in every case.
But this is surely acceptable within the context of the broader project of metaphysical
semantics. The master thesis of that project is that the structure of natural language
is not a sure guide to the fundamental structure of reality, and there is no reason to
suppose that logical structure should be an exception.9
Sider considers the case where L is governed by the logic arising from Kleene’s
strong matrix,10 K3. This provides the occasion for discussion of the Metaphysical
Liar: a puzzle raised by Hartry Field [12, 237]. First, assume that L has the resources
to express its own metaphysical truth-conditions. This is entirely unproblematic; after
all, the present paper, written in (augmented) English, has been talking about meta-
physical truth conditions for nonfundamental languages, such as English. But now
the reasoning to a puzzling conclusion is swift.
Sider makes the following assumptions, which suffice to generate a liar-style argu-
ment (apart from changes for the sake of notational consistency, the formalism is his,
not mine11):
(1) That L contains no non-factual sentences,and so every sentence of L has a
metaphysical truth condition.
(2) That the vocabulary of F is a subset of the vocabulary of L, and therefore that
L has the resources to express the metaphysical truth-conditions of its own sen-
tences.12 We write ‘Cxy’ for ‘x is a metaphysical truth-condition for y’. So for
any sentence φ in L there is φ0 ∈ L, such that C〈φ0〉〈φ〉 is true in L. The
angular brackets here serve to indicate a name for the bracketed sentence in L,
generated by Go¨del numbering or a similar technique.
(3) Metaphysical truth-conditions are unique.13 Thus the following inference is
valid: Cxy  Czy → z = x.
(4) C〈φ0〉〈φ〉, φ0  φ
9Indeed, if natural language quantifiers carved at the joints, metaphysical semantics would be robbed of
any ontological significance.
10For details see [8].
11This deserves emphasis. Questions could be raised about definition – for instance, how should the turn-
stile be read? Myself, I find the exposition at this level clear enough – ‘’ says that we have a licence to
infer the RHS from the LHS (and I would flesh this out as indicated by my remarks above about the avail-
ability of a proof system on the languages at issue). Discussions of the boundaries of metaphysics, logic,
and language are sometimes in danger of getting so bogged down in microtechnicalities that they miss the
basic philosophical problems with the set-up. Sufficient unto the day is the technical rigour thereof: on
this point at least, Sider is absolutely correct.
12This is because the metaphysical truth condition of any given sentence in L just is some sentence of F.
13I have varied that statement of uniqueness from the one Sider provides, for the sake of clarity. In a
context where L lacks a detachable conditional, (3) could be reformulated in purely rule form.
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Not all of these assumptions are beyond doubt, although we will see in due course
that the liar argument does not turn on any assumption undeserving of assent. We
will discuss (1)-(4) after we have laid out that argument.
Now, let ‘τ(y)’ abbreviate ∃x(Cxy) ∧ True(x)) – remember that L is semanti-
cally closed, and by hypothesis governed by K3 in response to the ensuing threat of
paradox. Diagonalising on ∼ τ(φ) yields:
∼ τ(〈M〉) (M)
We now have a sentence of L that says in effect that its own metaphysical truth con-
dition is untrue: M ∼ τ(〈M〉) and ∼ τ(〈M〉)  M . By (1), M has a metaphysical
truth condition; call this M0. As Sider understands (2), this yields that ‘C〈M0〉〈M〉’
is a sentence of L. Recall that F is governed by classical logic, and so we can
apply excluded middle to M0, since metaphysical truth-conditions are sentences in
F: (M0∨ ∼ M0). We reason by cases to M . From M0, the inference is immediate by
(4). Meanwhile from ∼ M0 we apply truth transparency to get ∼ True(〈M0〉). Since
by (3) M has no metaphysical truth-condition other than M0, we get ∼ τ(〈M〉), from
which follows M. This concludes the reasoning by cases. We now infer ∼ τ(〈M〉) from
M, and∼ True(M0) follows, by definition of τ inK3. Truth transparency gives∼ M0.
It follows therefore from assumptions (1)-(4) that both the sentence M and the
negation of the metaphysical truth condition of M can be proved.14 This is not in
itself a contradictory conclusion, which should give us reason to pause before talking
of paradox. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the preceding paragraph is puzzling, and
might be thought better avoided. A natural response is to revisit the assumptions
made in order to reason to that conclusion.
The problem with this route away from puzzlement is that each assumption is
either reasonable, or else can be weakened without damage to the argument. Let
us examine them in turn. (1) looks entirely innocuous: suppose that L does con-
tain non-factual sentences; then we simply consider the language L∗, which results
from removing these sentences from L and proceed as before. All that the argument
requires is that sentences stating metaphysical truth-conditions, as well as sentences
of the form Cxy, and any sentences formed from these sentences by binding
variables with quantifiers or affixing truth-functional connectives are factual, and
therefore have metaphysical truth-conditions. But on the face of it, this is central to
the project of metaphysical semantics. The situation with (2) is less straightforward.
It is not obvious that a non-fundamental language should contain the resources to
express all fundamental facts. The enterprise of metaphysical semantics finds moti-
vation from the thought that the languages we use do not carve at the joints of reality.
Yet the same thought might prompt us to consider the possibility that a language that
does carve at the joints might contain resources that are alien to our language, in the
sense that there is some sentence of the fundamental language that is not equivalent to
any sentence in our language. Given that L is supposed to be a language such as ours,
then, (2) should be rejected. However, much less than (2) is needed for the argument.
14Although, following Sider, we’ve taken the background logic for the proof to be K3 (the assumption
being that this governs L: a non-classical logic being adopted in response to the semantic paradoxes and
vagueness), it will go through in a wide range of logics, including classical logic.
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We do not need to assume that the whole vocabulary of F is included in L. Instead
we need only to be assured that L contains the resources to name M’s metaphysical
truth-conditions, M0, and to use those truth-conditions in reasoning by cases from
(M0∨ ∼ M0). But nothing in the argument turns on the content of M0; in this respect
the reasoning is entirely schematic. We can imagine the argument being presented
as follows: let 〈M0〉 name M’s metaphysical truth-condition, whatever it is. . . Now
either M0 or ∼ M0, either way. . . The fact that we don’t have access to the deep
logical structure of M0 is neither here nor there, since that structure is at no point
deployed in the proof.15 Such schematic reasoning can be carried out in a language
such as our own, which is what L is supposed to be, without exaggerated claims
about that language containing all the resources necessary to describe the fundamen-
tal structure of reality. The same considerations suggest that the metavariable on the
right-hand side of (T) be understood in a similarly schematic position: perhaps sense
could be made of this by taking it to be bound by an implicit existential quantifier.16
Conditions (3) and (4) are beyond controversy,17 as immediate consequences of
the theoretical role of metaphysical truth-conditions. We are then forced to confront
the conclusion of the argument: if sentences have metaphysical truth-conditions, then
there is a sentence such that both that sentence and the negation of its metaphysical
truth-condition can be proved. How should we respond to this?
Sider himself sketches two possible avenues of response. One is the adoption of
a ‘Tarskian hierarchical approach to metaphysical truth-conditions’: no language can
speak of its own metaphysical truth conditions, instead ascent to what we might call
a metaphysical meta-language is required in order to discuss the metaphysical truth
conditions of the original language. In Sider’s view, the usual objection to Tarskian
approaches to the truth predicate, namely that we do not appear to track Tarskian
levels when using ‘is true’ in English and its equivalents in other natural languages,
does not carry over to the case of metaphysical truth conditions: ‘[it] is no objection
to a Tarskian approach to the theoretical concept of metaphysical truth-conditions’.
The thought seems to be that the theoretical nature of metaphysical truth-conditions
makes a Tarskian hierarchy acceptable in this case, even though a parallel approach
is unacceptable when applied to the pre-theoretical concept of truth. It certainly can
be admitted that the concept of metaphysical truth-conditions is theoretical in a man-
ner that the concept of truth is not: people who are not philosophers say things like
‘everything the speaker said was true’; they do not say things like ‘every sentence
uttered by the speaker had true metaphysical truth-conditions’. However it is not
clear, to me at least, that this difference carries over to justify a Tarskian approach
15Compare a routine kind of proof in (non-constructive) mathematics. Let G be Goldbach’s Conjecture:
now either G or ∼ G. If ∼ G, then let n be the smallest counterexample. . . We don’t know which number
n is, if indeed there is such a number, but that doesn’t matter for the purpose of the proof. All that matters
is the role that n plays if indeed it exists (and in this case, properties it possesses in virtue of that role:
being even, greater than two and not being the sum of two primes).
16So: there is a metaphysical truth-condition for any declarative sentence of English. It’s just that the
metaphysical truth-condition isn’t, in general, itself a sentence of English.
17In the sense that, if metaphysical semantics is going to get off the ground, then (3) and (4) need to be
true. Plenty of people, of course, think that metaphysical semantics should remain on the tarmac, and there-
fore reject (3) and (4). But given that the present dialectic occupies, if only hypothetically, a framework
accepting of metaphysical and semantics, the two assumptions should stand.
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to metaphysical truth-conditions. After all, our theoretical discussion of metaphysi-
cal truth-conditions, no less that our workaday deployment of the truth predicate, is
conducted in a natural language that displays no sign of sensitivity to hierarchical
levels. On the contrary, metaphysical semantics, as described at the beginning of this
paper and as executed by contemporary philosophers, is conducted in English and
is intended to supply truth-conditions for inter alia the sentences of English. Prob-
lems exactly parallel to those accruing to the Tarskian18 hierarchical approach to
the truth predicate arise. For example, consider two metaphysicians, each well dis-
posed towards the other, simultaneously teaching classes on metaphysical semantics.
Wanting to illustrate the function of these semantics whilst praising her colleague,
Dr X says ‘every sentence Dr Y is uttering in her lecture has a true metaphysical
truth-condition’. Similarly, Dr Y, with similar motives, says ‘every sentence Dr X is
uttering in her lecture has a true metaphysical truth-condition’. There is no consis-
tent way of assigning levels to these two sentences, but there does not appear to be
anything out of order in either.
We will leave that issue there, since the Tarskian response to the liar argument is
not Sider’s preferred one. Rather, he tentatively counsels living with the puzzlement.
A metaphysical theory which postulates metaphysical truth-conditions for natural
language sentences is to be accepted as the most explanatory theory, by the normal
criteria of theory choice. The fact that a good explanatory theory has an anomalous
case is simply to be accepted, perhaps as a small cost outweighed by the theory’s
benefits [12, 238]. The burden of the rest of this paper is to argue that we cannot
acquiesce in this manner, since the anomalous case forces an explicitly contradictory
conclusion given an incredibly attractive auxiliary premise. This promises trouble for
the advocate of metaphysical semantics.
The Field-Sider liar argument concludes with a puzzle, not a contradiction. How-
ever, inconsistency is waiting in the wings. L is supposed to be a language with the
resources to discuss, at least in outline, its own metaphysical semantics. So it follows
that we should admit:
C〈φ〉〈ψ〉,True(ψ)  φ (U)
Equation U allows us to infer from the truth of some sentences that the meta-
physical truth-condition of that sentence obtains. An inference of this form has to
be valid if metaphysical truth-conditions are deserving of the description.19 For
18At this point I minute a complaint about the use of ‘Tarskian’ in this kind of context: Tarski himself was
explicit that his theory of truth was for formal languages, and was pessimistic about the prospects of a
theory of truth for natural language. The literature is deaf to this complaint, however, hence my own use
of the offending adjective.
19Objection: You’re not taking seriously enough the extent to which we’re talking about metaphysical
truth-conditions. A principle along the lines of U is acceptable for the kind of theory of truth a linguistic
semanticist might supply. But here we’re engaged in a different, more fundamental enquiry. Response: (1)
The formulation of T gives ample motivation for thinking that Sider should accept (U). There is some
room for negotiation if the language in which U is stated is governed by a logic for which modus ponens
fails for the salient conditional (some paraconsistent logics would be candidates). But this just forces more
urgently the questions: (2) What (we ask the objector) is the nature of this different, more fundamental
enquiry? How does it relate to our antedently given understanding of truth? What are the constraints on
theory formation with respect to it? Absent an answer to these questions, the objector is simply stipulating
away a difficulty.
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suppose it was possible that a sentence φ be true without its metaphysical truth-
condition obtaining. By (1), φ has such a truth-condition, and by (3) it is unique: call
this truth condition t . Were φ true without t being true, there is no sense in which t is
a truth-condition for φ, for this would involve the truth of φ being conditional on that
of t .20
Suppose moreover that the following inference is valid:
φ  True(φ) (IN)
This is an enquotation principle, consonant with a disquotational or minimalist
approach to truth. There may be all kinds of objections that can be made to it, but they
are not ones which are available to the Siderian. Not only does the Field-Sider argu-
ment appeal to truth transparency, but also Sider’s principal motivation for embracing
nonfundamental nonclassicality is to allow a solution to semantic paradoxes aris-
ing from the naive T-schema. But (IN) just is a rule version of one direction of that
schema.21
Now, recall that C〈M0〉〈M〉. We already have ∼ M0 and M by the Field-Sider
argument. From M we use (T) and (IN) to conclude M0: contradiction. Note, more-
over, that we have shown – by classically impeccable reasoning, and in a purely
schematic fashion in the sense discussed earlier – that for some φ in F, (φ∧ ∼ φ)
obtains, for M0 is the metaphysical truth-condition for a sentence in L, and F
expresses these conditions. But F is supposed to be governed by classical logic, which
validates ex contradictione quodlibet, so triviality ensues.22
Trivialism has to be rejected,23 so something has to give. One option would be
to follow the argument where it leads, and embrace the contradiction, accepting that
both ∼ M0 and M0 are true. In order to avoid trivialism, F will need to be governed
by a paraconsistent logic.24 We have then a form of dialetheism.25 Indeed we have
fundamental dialetheism – the doctrine that any true description of the fundamen-
tal structure of reality will be inconsistent. This will be thought by many too high a
price to pay; the literature around dialetheism has encountered most resistance with
respect to the claim that extra-linguistic reality is inconsistent,26 with the position
20Quite what ‘being conditional on’ involves here is a nice question. The thought is that t grounds the truth
of φ. This is clearly a much more exacting condition than the truth of the material conditional φ → t,
but it at least requires the truth of that conditional.
21Thanks to N for discussion here.
22It has been suggested to me that this is a form of argument by reductio, not valid in K3 and other
nonclassical candidates for governing a nonfundamental language. To say this is to demonstrate a misun-
derstanding of the dialectic. The argument to M0 certainly does go through, and that is all we need to argue
to fundamental triviality (remember: F is governed classically). At this point I claim simply that this is
unacceptable and should be rejected. I require for this purpose no connection between rejection and either
negation or falsehood (much though I think those connections should be made, and might provide us with
other reasons for wariness about the picture Sider presents).
23Although, see [7] for confirmation of the thought that there is no position so outrageous that it has not
been defended by at least one philosopher!
24A logic is paraconsistent iff it does not validate ex contradictione quodlibet For details and fine
distinctions see [11].
25The classic exposition is [9].
26In the sense that it cannot be described truthfully without some contradiction being asserted.
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that inconsistency is somehow a side effect of human language being a more moder-
ate fallback.27 An alternative would be to take F to be governed by a paracomplete
logic,28 thereby blocking the derivation of paradox by disallowing appeal to the law
of excluded middle for F.
Sider’s hope was to hold open the option of resolving the semantic paradoxes
through recourse to a nonclassical logic, by allowing that a nonfundamental logic
might be governed by a nonclassical logic whilst retaining classical logic for a funda-
mental language. The foregoing shows that this cannot be achieved given the account
of metaphysical semantics on offer. This is unfortunate, since the motivation for this
strategy was a good one. Classical logic is powerful, well-understood and success-
ful for the purposes of mathematics and physical science, yet seems altogether less
well-equipped as a candidate for governing natural languages. If it were possible to
do duty to both insights, by allowing that natural language is governed nonclassically
and a fundamental language is classical, whilst also adopting the simple and appeal-
ing account of metaphysical semantics, then genuine philosophical progress would
have been made.
On the current account of metaphysical semantics, it is not to be. The choice that
arises regarding nonfundamental languages confronted with the semantic paradoxes
– either abandon classical logic, or else abandon theoretical commitments needed for
the derivation of contradiction (i.e. some aspect of naive truth theory) – recurs when
we consider a fundamental language. Either we need to concede that the fundamen-
tal language is governed by a paraconsistent, paracomplete, or otherwise nonclassical
logic, or else we need to reject at least one of the assumptions (1)-(4), (IN) and (U)
about the relationship between conditions statable in the fundamental language and
sentences of a nonfundamental language for which a metaphysical semantics is being
provided. When we examined these earlier, they seemed either impregnable or per-
missive of modification without injury to the liar argument.29 But that was before the
threat of triviality was introduced to the dialectic. This provides the strongest possi-
ble motivation for belief revision. A context in which our present beliefs trivialise,
however antecedently justified they may have appeared, is one in which those beliefs
should be subjected to renewed scrutiny and alteration. Is there, then, an assumption
which could be revised?
In my view there is. Recall Sider’s first assumption,
(1) That L contains no non-factual sentences,and so every sentence of L has a
metaphysical truth condition.
We noted that this was plausible in the light of the fact that, if a given language
contains non-factual sentences, we can simply consider the maximal fragment of that
language containing only factual sentences, and run the argument with this second
27See [3]. For defence of the stronger position see [9].
28A logic is paracomplete iff it does not validate unrestricted excluded middle. On this kind of approach
to semantic paradoxes see [5].
29For the sake of completeness, one could abandon one or more structural rules for the nonfundamental
logic, in the hope of blocking the derivation of paradox. I do not find this route attractive, but the possibility
is there for those less squeamish than me. On this approach to paradoxes elsewhere see [14].
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language as L. All that is required of the new language is that sentences stating meta-
physical truth-conditions, as well as sentences of the form Cxy, and any sentences
formed from these sentences by binding variables with quantifiers or affixing truth-
functional connectives are factual, and therefore have metaphysical truth-conditions.
What is clearly right about this is that talk of metaphysical truth-conditions and of
their relationship to sentences in natural language is intended as factual. When the
metaphysical semanticist says things like ‘sentences containing modal vocabulary
have metaphysical truth-conditions statable without use of modal vocabulary’, she
is not merely clearing her throat or expressing an emotional disposition or attitude
(‘Modality - boo!’). On the contrary she is asserting something which she takes to be
true. To the extent that (1) articulates this it is beyond revision without fatal injury
to the project of metaphysical semantics. However, this is not all that (1) says. As
well as claiming that the salient class of sentences are factual it goes on to assert,
on the basis of this former claim, that every such sentence has a metaphysical truth-
condition.
The reasoning behind the inference from φ is factual to φ has a metaphysical
truth-condition is clear enough. A natural thought is that factual sentences are intro-
duced into conversation as candidates for truth,30 and that the relevant theorem of
a metaphysical semantic theory for a given sentence explains what the truth of that
sentence would consist in. Here then is a picture of truth for a fundamental language:
truth is what you get when the conditions assigned by the theory to a given sentence
obtains. By affirming this picture the metaphysical semanticist can preserve the real-
ist credo that a truth sentence is true in virtue of somehow conforming to the facts.31
The sentence need not, of course, describe the world in a way that makes appar-
ent the fundamental structure of reality, but nonetheless there is some part of reality,
specified by the semantic theory, in virtue of which the sentence is true.
It is tempting to enhance this picture of truth with a parallel treatment of falsity:
falsity is what you get when the conditions assigned by the metaphysical semantics to
a given sentence don’t obtain. Unfortunately for those who find this compelling, it is
incompatible with pairing a nonclassical nonfundamental language with a classically
behaved fundamental language, the holding open of which possibility is supposed to
be a virtue of metaphysical semantics. The reasons for this are discussed briefly in
an Appendix. Because of this problem no doubt Sider allows that the negation of a
sentence may have a metaphysical truth-condition of its own; the truth of ¬φ may
make distinct demands on reality, over and above that the demands made by the truth
of φ are not satisfied. Questions remain about whether a satisfactory philosophical
account can be offered of the relationship between truth and falsity32 given the failure
30Or for expressing truths, if one takes entities other than sentences to be the primary bearers of truth.
31Thus stated this is basicallyWright’s correspondence platitude [15, 25]. Since the metaphysical semanti-
cist wants to claim that fundamental reality explains nonfundamental truth, however, one might be tempted
to strengthen it to a version of a principle Wright discusses from Horwich, whereby a sentence is true
because its truth condition obtains [15, 26] [6, Ch. 7].
32The point here is that even if truth and falsity are not jointly exhaustive and pairwise exclusive,
they surely must be some close conceptual connection between them. They are not simply two distinct
properties which sentences might happen to possess.
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to treat falsity as simply the absence of truth, but let us allow Sider that move and
return our attention to (1).
It would be nice to be able to do unrestricted justice to the natural picture of truth
and keep (1). Unfortunately, we need to restore consistency to metaphysical seman-
tics, and the principle looks more dispensable than the others. That said rejection of
(1) should also cause us to modify (2) further than we have already had cause to:
we do not want to commit ourselves to talking, even schematically, about the meta-
physical truth-conditions of sentences which lack metaphysical truth-conditions. If
we wish, (1) can be replaced with the harmless:
(1*) That L contains no non-factual sentences
I conjecture, furthermore that we would be safe with:
(1**) That L contains no non-factual sentences, and that every sentence in L
not containing semantic vocabulary has a metaphysical truth-condition.
If we want to think that the need for nonclassical logic arises not simply from
semantic paradox (including metaphysically semantic paradox33), but also from con-
siderations about vagueness, the open future, set theory, or whatever else, (1**) could
be expanded to accommodate this. The question remains whether the restriction in
(1**) can be motivated. A quick response that is not without force is that the avoid-
ance of triviality is as good a motivation as one could wish for, and given that classical
responses to semantic paradoxes are unpersuasive, this excellent motivation com-
bines with our desire for a nonclassical solution to force revision of (1). However,
there is a more exacting sense to the initial question: what we want is not simply a
reason for replacing (1) with (1**); we undoubtedly have that. Instead it would be
good to have a compelling metaphysical picture on which this revision appears nat-
ural, rather than as simply theoretical back-pedalling in the face of paradox. Is there
such a picture to be had?
Here is one attempt: semantic notions are not fundamental. Rather they arise from
our attempts to understand the world in which we exist, the languages we use to
describe it, and the relationship between the two. In well-behaved cases we can tell
a systematic storey about how the world is such that certain sentences are true. A
Sider-style metaphysical semantics is a case in point, and for the well-behaved bits of
assertoric language, those whose truth-value obtains in virtue of a systematic tracking
of fundamental reality by language, we might suppose that something along the lines
of (1) is correct. We might, further, imagine this situation to obtain for paradigm cases
such as the fragments of natural languages used in the natural sciences and mathemat-
ics. That there are non well-behaved cases is a by-product of our semantic concepts.
An example is ‘the metaphysical truth-condition of this sentence is false’. That this
sentence doesn’t track the world outside language is less obvious than in the more
familiar cases of standard semantic paradoxes. ‘This sentence is false’, for exam-
ple, is quite obviously about no reality external to the sentence itself, and contingent
33That the extension of ‘semantic’ includes that of ‘metaphysically semantic’ should now be assumed in
what follows.
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liar sentences, even though they are about things other than themselves (namely
other sentences) are concerned solely with semantic aspects of language. They are,
in Beall’s phrase, ‘spandrels of truth’, curiosities which arise automatically when we
equip our language with semantic vocabulary.
By contrast it might be thought that ‘the metaphysical truth-condition of this sen-
tence is false’ is about the fundamental building blocks of reality, whatever it is that
a fundamental language talks about. This is the import of it talking about its own
metaphysical truth-condition. Here we should stand firm: the assumption that this
sentence tracks fundamental reality has consequences we cannot accept, and should
be rejected.34 The spandrels of metaphysical semantics are more subtle than those
of common-or-garden truth, but they are there nonetheless. It is useful to be able
to talk about metaphysical truth-conditions: Sider’s book wouldn’t have got off the
ground were we not able to enhance our language with this ability. But once we have
enhanced our language in this way, pathological sentences arise which are cloaked in
the illusion of traction on fundamental reality. The truth is that the metaphysical liar
cannot track fundamental reality in a systematic way (and this is what having a meta-
physical truth-condition involves), and so it does not. Of course, all the facts about
relevant tokenings of the sentence, concerning marks on paper, thoughts in minds and
bits in RAM chips, will obtain in virtue of circumstances describable in a fundamen-
tal language. But this is very different from the sentence type having a metaphysical
truth-condition.
But, it might well be objected, surely we want to say something about how
sentences containing metaphysically semantic vocabulary relate to fundamental real-
ity.35 This has to be right: after all both Sider’s book and the present paper contain
English sentences which talk about truth and its relation to metaphysical truth-
conditions. If there is no sense in which those sentences represent the world as
being a certain way, then talk of metaphysical semantics is unintelligible. But this
desideratum would be satisfied by Sider’s lights just in virtue of the semantic fea-
tures of the English sentences in which the metaphysical semantics is articulated
(recall that for Sider metaphysical semantics is distinct from linguistic semantics36).
Expressions of a nonfundamental language can denote, and sentences of the language
be used to make true claims about, aspects of fundamental reality. It is just that
they do not do so in virtue of fundamental reality. This might well sound opaque,
and perhaps it is ultimately unsustainable, but what is on offer here is a version of
34We should not be misled by the occurrence of the definite description ‘the metaphysical truth-condition
of this sentence’ in the sentence to attempt Russelling the issue away. The definite description is quite
incidental, and (as we did above) can use Godelisation techniques to get a metaphysical liar sentence that
doesn’t include one.
35Thanks to a referee for pressing this point.
36As will be clear from what I have written above, I am sceptical of this distinction, and so think that the
need to appeal to it counts against the proposed rescue of metaphysical semantics. It seems to me that if
a Siderian wants to avail herself of this rescue package, she either needs to explicate the distinction or
modify it. My own sense is that the latter route is preferable – the Siderian should drop the claim that there
is any sense in which a metaphysical semantics is a theory of meaning. But if this is right, then an account
is owed of the relationship between truth and meaning, and between both and the use of language.
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alethic pluralism: ‘well-behaved’ sentences of natural language are candidates for
a truth-property which may be analysed in terms of the existence of a metaphysi-
cal truth-maker, whereas sentences containing metaphysically semantic vocabulary
are potential bearers of a minimalist truth property. The challenge for the metaphys-
ical semanticist taking this route is whether she can answer the complaint that the
view unacceptably detaches the truth property for metaphysically semantic sentences
from the function of those sentences in representing fundamental reality. My advice
to her would be to insist that the question doesn’t take the minimalist nature of the
operative truth property seriously; my concern would be that this doesn’t take the
connection between minimalism about truth and minimalism about reference seri-
ously enough – is this rescue move self-undermining, in that it robs the Siderian
of the capacity to talk about the fundamental in a manner susceptible to a realist
construal?
Let that debate be resolved as it will. The picture just sketched is an example of
how someone sympathetic to the thought that nonclassicality is needed solely because
of semantic paradoxes – a thought to which I am sympathetic without being a signed-
up adherent – might flesh out the revision of (1). Those with other motivations for
adopting a nonclassical logic to govern a nonfundamental language within a frame-
work of metaphysical semantics will draw things differently, but the desideratum is
clear: explain why, for a given class of sentences demanding non-classical treatment,
these sentences are such that they do not track fundamental reality, and so why they
– if true – possess a truth property distinct from that possessed by true sentences with
a metaphysical truth-condition.37
The metaphysical liar argument is more bothersome than Sider allows. It can be
turned into a metaphysical liar paradox. As we’ve seen, there are two routes back
from the precipice of triviality which cohere with the original aspirations of meta-
physical semantics. We can accept that logic is fundamentally non-classical. For
whatever reason, good or bad, there tends to be some antipathy to this suggestion
(how can there be contradictions, or vagueness, or indeterminacy in reality?), hence
Sider’s original project. So perhaps we might instead insist that logic is fundamen-
tally classical, and tweak the set-up of our metaphysical semantics to avoid paradox.
Both of the options have been laid out here. The metaphysical semanticist must affirm
the disjunction of the options. I take it that disjunction is sufficiently classical in its
behaviour for her to be committed thereby to the truth of one of the disjuncts.
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37Depending on one’s metaphysics of properties it might be suggested that both sentences share a property
being true simpliciter. This might be right. The salient point is that they possess distinct determinate truth
properties.
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Appendix: Falsehood as non-obtaining of metaphysical truth-conditions
We show that the picture wherein truth for a sentence in L consists in the obtaining,
falsehood in the non-obtaining of its metaphysical truth-condition forces the classical
behaviour of negation in L. Where φL is nonfundamental and ψF its metaphysical
truth condition.
Exhaustivity Either φL is true or φL is false.
Proof First suppose that ψF. Then, since a sentence in L is true if its metaphysical
truth-condition obtains, φL is true. Now, suppose ∼ ψF. Then, since a sentence in L
is false if its metaphysical truth-condition does not obtain, φL is false. But excluded
middle holds for F, so by disjunction introduction on either case, plus dilemma on
LEM, we are done.
Exclusivity φL is true iff it is not false.
Proof L-R Assume φL is true, so ψF. But F validates every instance of ∼ (γ∧ ∼ γ ),
so ∼∼ ψF, so φL is not false. R-L Since φL is true, ψF. Invocation of ∼ (γ∧ ∼ γ )
gets us the desired result as before.
Note that in both proofs we are using the fact that negation in F behaves classically.
A dialetheist, for instance, could object to the proof of exclusivity, not on the basis
that ∼ (γ∧ ∼ γ ) is invoked (after all, every instance of this is a logical truth in
LP), but on the basis that the falsity of ∼ ψF, which the dialetheist agrees is equiv-
alent to the truth of its negation, is incompatible with its truth. However, we are
currently considering a strategy in which F is governed classically, even though L is
not, so by hypothesis a dialetheist ought to accept classical reasoning as applied to
metaphysical truth-conditions. What has gone wrong?
The problem is this, that the operative picture of truth, combined with the classi-
cal nature of metaphysical truth-conditions, enforces classical behaviour of negation
in the language for which metaphysical truth-conditions are being supplied. Now,
the master thesis behind the application of metaphysical semantics in the philoso-
phy of logic was that logical vocabulary in a nonfundamental language might not
carve at the joints. Leaving aside the case of quantifiers, the non joint-carving nature
of which in natural language is surely de fide for the metaphysical semanticist, the
case for this is persuasive especially in the case of negation.38 In any case, given that
debates between classical and nonclassical logicians are usually best viewed as con-
cerning the logic of negation, it is fatal to any metaphysical semantics which hopes
38Conditionals strike me as being another prime candidate.
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to reconcile fundamental classicality and nonfundamental nonclassicality to impose
a condition which enforces a uniform treatment of negation between the fundamental
and nonfundamental levels.
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